Vijay Yerramilli
John H. Duncan Associate Professor of Finance
C. T. Bauer College of Business
University of Houston

Contact information:
240D, Melcher Hall
University of Houston
Houston, TX 77584
Phone: (713) 743-2516
Fax: (713) 743-4789

SSRN page:

Vita: Click here


"Optimal Capital Structure and Investment with Real Options and Endogenous Debt Costs" (with Praveen Kumar)
Review of Financial Studies, 2018, Vol. 31, pp. 3452--3490

"Uncertainty, Capital Investment, and Risk Management" (with Hitesh Doshi and Praveen Kumar)
Management Science, 2018, Vol. 64, pp. 5769--5786
(Here's the Internet Appendix)

"Debt Maturity Structure and Credit Quality" (with Radhakrishnan Gopalan and Fenghua Song)
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2014, Vol. 49, pp. 817--842

"Market Efficiency, Managerial Compensation, and Real Efficiency" (with Rajdeep Singh)
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2014, Vol. 29, pp. 561--578

"Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies" (with Andrew Ellul)
Journal of Finance, 2013, Vol. 68 (5), pp. 1757--1803
(Here's the Internet Appendix)

"Moral Hazard, Hold-up, and the Optimal Allocation of Control Rights"
RAND Journal of Economics, 2011, Vol. 42 (4), pp. 705--728

"Does poor performance damage the reputation of financial intermediaries? Evidence from the loan syndication market"
(with Radhakrishnan Gopalan and Vikram Nanda)
Journal of Finance, 2011, Vol. 66 (6), pp. 2083--2120

"Why do Firms Form New Banking Relationships?" (with Radhakrishnan Gopalan and Gregory F. Udell)
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2011, Vol. 46 (5), pp. 1335--1365

"Entrepreneurial Finance: Banks versus Venture Capital" (with Andrew Winton)
Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, Vol. 88 (1), pp. 51--79

"The effect of decimalization on the components of the bid-ask spread" (with Scott Gibson and Rajdeep Singh)
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2003, Vol. 12, pp. 121--148

Completed Working Papers:

"Outside Directors at Early-Stage Startups" (with Buvaneshwaran Venugopal)
Abstract: We use unique hand-collected data to understand why early-stage startups appoint outside directors, the type of outside directors they appoint, and the consequent effects on their future performance. Early-stage startups with better performance and less severe agency conflicts with their investors are more likely to appoint outside directors. An individual is more likely to be appointed to this role if he has invested in that startup, shares a past professional connection with the startup's founder or investors, has past entrepreneurial or board experience, and whose experience complements that of the founder. A start-up is more likely to attract future directors and future investors that share a past professional connection with the early-stage outside director. Early-stage startups with outside directors raise larger amounts in later-stage rounds, are more likely to attract VC funding, file more patents, and are more likely to exit successfully, especially through IPOs than similar startups without outside directors. Interestingly, startups whose early-stage investors serve as directors take longer to exit, are more likely to exit via acquisition rather than IPO, and file fewer patents than similar startups with non-investor directors.

"Seed-Stage Success and Growth of Angel Networks" (with Buvaneshwaran Venugopal)
Abstract: Using unique hand-collected data, we show that syndication is widespread in the angel investment market, even among seed-stage startups. Individual angels that demonstrate seed-stage success experience an increase in the quantity, quality, and geographic spread of their co-investment connections relative to unsuccessful peers, and are rewarded with more deal flow. These results are stronger for less-established angels and when the seed-stage success indicates skill rather than luck. Success also begets more success, making it more likely that the angel's other portfolio companies receive follow-on financing, especially from VC firms.
(Here's the Internet Appendix)

"Relative Values, Announcement Timing, and Shareholder Returns in Mergers and Acquisitions" (with Sangwon Lee)
Abstract: We show that M\&A deals that are announced when the bidder's relative value (ratio of bidder's equity value to target's equity value) is closer to its 52-week high feature higher offer premium, lower (higher) announcement returns for the bidding (target) firm, and are more likely to fail, all else equal. Yet, bidders in such deals also experience large abnormal returns in the two-year period surrounding the announcement. Our results suggest that bidders strategically choose announcement timing to exploit relative misvaluation, and cast doubt on the idea that announcement returns represent the gains to long-term shareholders of bidding firms.

"Sunk-Cost Fallacy and Seller Behavior in the Housing Market" (with Dimuthu Ratnadiwakara)
Abstract: We use a unique feature of California's property tax system to empirically identify the effect of selling homeowners' past property tax payments on their choice of listing price. Although past property taxes are sunk costs, we find that they have a significant positive effect on the sellers' choice of listing price, which is inconsistent with rational models of decision making. This effect is stronger when sellers expect to sell at a loss relative to their purchase price, for high-valued properties, and in zip codes with lower housing transaction volumes. Interestingly, the sunk-cost effect is also stronger for sellers with higher mortgage debt, especially when they expect to incur a loss on the sale. Overall, our results suggest that the sunk-cost fallacy affects seller behavior in the housing market.

"Lender Moral Hazard and Reputation in Originate-to-Distribute Markets" (with Andrew Winton)
Abstract: In a dynamic model of originate-to-distribute lending, we examine whether reputation concerns can incentivize a bank to monitor loans it has sold. Investors believe that banks with fewer recent loan defaults are more likely to monitor ("have higher reputation"). In equilibrium, banks monitor more and retain a smaller loan fraction when their reputations are high. Monitoring is harder to sustain in periods with uncommonly large spikes in loan demand ("booms"), especially for low-reputation banks, which are more likely to accommodate boom demand and forgo monitoring. Increased likelihood of facing a rival with reputation concerns also weakens monitoring incentives.

"Do Bond Investors Price Tail Risk Exposures of Financial Institutions?" (with Sudheer Chava and Rohan Ganduri)
Abstract: We analyze whether bond investors price tail risk exposures of financial institutions using a comprehensive sample of bond issuances by U.S. financial institutions. Although primary bond yield spreads increase with an institutions' own tail risk (expected shortfall), systematic tail risk (marginal expected shortfall) of the institution doesn't affect its yields. The relationship between yield spreads and tail risk is significantly weaker for depository institutions, large institutions, government-sponsored entities, politically-connected institutions, and in periods following large-scale bailouts of financial institutions. Overall, our results suggest that implicit bailout guarantees of financial institutions can exacerbate moral hazard in bond markets and weaken market discipline.

"Insider Ownership and Shareholder Value: Evidence from New Project Announcements" (with Meghana Ayyagari and Radhakrishnan Gopalan)
Abstract: Most firms outside the U.S. have one or more controlling shareholders that manage multiple firms within a business group structure with very little direct cash flow rights. We employ a novel dataset of new capital investment projects announced by publicly-listed Indian firms to estimate the value implications of such complex ownership structures. Focusing on the market's assessment of the \emph{marginal value} of new projects enables us to overcome problems associated with employing average Tobin's q as a value measure. We find that the project announcement returns are significantly larger for projects of group firms with high insider holding as compared to projects of group firms with low insider holding. This effect is larger for projects that result in either the firm or the business group diversifying into a new industry, and for firms with high level of free cash flows. Our results obtain when we employ a matching estimator and when we instrument for the level of insider holding. Overall, our results are consistent with business group insiders expropriating outside shareholders by selectively housing more (less) valuable projects in firms with high (low) insider holding.

Other Links:

Bauer M.S. in Finance Program

The Finance Department

C. T. Bauer College of Business