

# I. DFI

<u>Definition</u>: A *Direct Foreign Investment (*DFI) is a controlling ownership in a business enterprise in one country by an entity based in another country. Also called FDI.

- Controlling ownership: 10%+ of voting stock (World Bank/OECD).

- DFI is different from portfolio investing abroad.

- DFIs: Greenfield investments (building a new operational facility), mergers & acquisitions, a joint venture, etc.

- Instruments: Equity, Reinvestment of earnings, Debt.

• According to OECD, global DFI in 2022 was **USD 1.01 trillion**. In 2020 (pandemic year), DFI was down 34%.

- US biggest recipient of DFI, followed by China, Brazil, Australia, Canada.

- High income countries receive almost half DFI flows.



### • Factors behind DFI:

According to the annual DFI survey of A.T. Kearney, the main drivers are *regulatory transparency/lack of corruption, taxes,* and *labor costs.* 



## • DFI: Why?

- A domestic firm can sell a product abroad by:
  - Producing at home and exporting production.
  - Producing abroad (& do a DFI) and selling abroad.
- Q: Why DFI instead of exports?

A: Usual reasons:

- Access to cheap inputs (labor, energy, etc.)
- Avoid tariffs, quotas & reduce transportation costs
- Local management
- Take advantage of government subsidies
- Access to new technology
- Access to local expertise (including: contacts, red tape, etc.)
- Real option (investment today to make investments elsewhere later).
- Reduce economic exposure
- Diversification

Diversification through DFI

MNCs have **many DFI projects**. MNCs select the project that improves their **risk-reward profile**.

• Popular risk-adjusted performance measures (RAPM):

Reward to variability (Sharpe ratio):

Reward to volatility (Treynor ratio):

Jensen's alpha measure:

**RVAR** =  $E[(r_i - r_f)]/SD_i$ . **RVOL** =  $E[(r_i - r_f)]/Beta_i$  **Estimated constant** ( $\alpha_i$ ) on a CAPM-like regression

• We focus on RVAR & RVOL to evaluate projects. Q: RVAR or RVOL?

- **RVAR** (SR) uses total risk ( $\sigma$ ); appropriate for *undiversified* portfolios.

When asset *i* is a small part of a diversified portfolio;  $\sigma$  is inappropriate.

- **RVOL** (TR) emphasizes *systematic risk*, appropriate measure of risk, according to the CAPM, when a portfolio is diversified.

Measures: $RVAR_i = E $ $RVOL_i = E $ <b>Example</b> : A U.S. investor <b>c</b>	$[(r_i - r_i)]$	•					
		$[f)]/\beta_i$					
<b>Example</b> : A U.S. investor c	onside						
	Junsiac	<b>Example</b> : A U.S. investor considers foreign stock markets:					
		ß <sub>WLD</sub>	RVAR	RVOL			
<b>Brazil</b> 0.2693	0.52	1.462	0.5170	0.1842			
<b>HK</b> 0.1237	0.36	0.972	0.3461	0.1273			
<b>Switzerl</b> 0.0548	0.19	0.759	0.2884	0.0722			
<b>Norway</b> 0.0715	0.29	1.094	0.2466	0.0654			
<b>USA</b> 0.0231	0.16	0.769	0.1444	0.0300			
<b>France</b> 0.0322	0.22	1.073	0.1464	0.0300			
<b>Italy</b> 0.0014	0.26	0.921	0.0054	0.0015			
<b>World</b> 0.0483	0.155	1.0	0.3116	0.0483			

Example: RVAR and RVOL (continuation) Using RVAR and RVOL, we can rank the foreign markets as follows: Rank **RVAR RVOL** Brazil Brazil 1 2 Hong Kong Hong Kong 3 Switzerland Switzerland 4 Norway Norway 5 USA France 6 USA France Note: RVAR and RVOL can produce different rankings.

Diversification through DFI: RVAR and RVOL
Compute E[r<sub>p</sub>] & Var[r<sub>p</sub>] for a portfolio, compose by X & Y, as: E[r<sub>p=x+y</sub>] = ω<sub>x</sub> \* E[r<sub>x</sub>] + (1 - ω<sub>x</sub>) \* E[r<sub>y</sub>] Var[r<sub>p=x+y</sub>] = σ<sup>2</sup><sub>x+y</sub> = ω<sup>2</sup><sub>x</sub> \* σ<sup>2</sup><sub>x</sub> + ω<sup>2</sup><sub>y</sub> \* σ<sup>2</sup><sub>y</sub> + 2 ω<sub>x</sub> ω<sub>y</sub> ρ<sub>x,y</sub> σ<sub>x</sub> σ<sub>y</sub> RVAR<sub>p</sub> = (r<sub>p</sub> - r<sub>f</sub>)/ σ<sub>p</sub>
Compute β of the X+Y portfolio: β<sub>p=x+y</sub> = ω<sub>x</sub> \* β<sub>x</sub> + (1 - ω<sub>x</sub>) \* β<sub>y</sub> RVOL<sub>p</sub> = (r<sub>p</sub> - r<sub>f</sub>)/ β<sub>p</sub>.
Note: If project is added, MCN becomes X+Y Y = Project MNC is considering X = Existing portfolio of MNC -i.e., the "rest of the MNC."

Example: A US company considers two DFIs: Colombia & Brazil.					
The firm has the following data, assuming $r_f = 3\%$ :					
	$E[r_i]$	$SD[r_i] = \sigma_i$	β <sub>i</sub>	$\rho_{US,i}$	Weight
US firm (EP)	13%	12%	.90	-	-
Colombia	18%	25%	.60	0.40	.30
Brazil	23%	30%	.30	0.05	.35
$\omega_{Col} = .30, \qquad \Rightarrow (1 - \omega_{Col}) = \omega_{EP} = .70$					
$\omega_{Brazil} = .35, \qquad \Rightarrow (1 - \omega_{Brazil}) = \omega_{EP} = .65$					
Q: Which project is better? Calculate a RAPM for each project: - SR = $E[(r_i - r_f)]/\sigma_i$					
$- \mathrm{TR} = \mathrm{E}[(r_i - r_f)]/\beta_i$					
For the US company:					
$SR_{EP} = (.1303) / .12 = .833$					
$TR_{EP} = (.1303) / .90 = .111$					

Example (continuation): • Colombia – Calculation of SR and TR  $E[r_{EP+Col} - r_f] = \omega_{EP} * E[r_{EP} - r_f] + \omega_{Col} * E[r_{Col} - r_f]$  = .70 \* .10 + .30 \* .15 = 0.115  $\sigma_{EP+Col}^2 = \omega_{EP}^2 * \sigma_{EP}^2 + \omega_{Col}^2 * \sigma_{Col}^2 + 2 * \omega_{EP} * \omega_{Col} * \rho_{EP,Col} * \sigma_{EP} *$   $= (.70)^2 * (.12)^2 + (.30)^2 * (.25)^2 + 2^*.70^*.30^{*}0.40^*.12^{*}.25$  = 0.017721  $\sigma_{EP+Col} = (\sigma_{EP+Col}^2)^{1/2} = (0.017721)^{1/2} = 0.1331$   $\beta_{EP+Col} = \omega_{EP} * \beta_{EP} + \omega_{Col} * \beta_{Col} = .70 * .90 + .30 * .60 = 0.81$   $\circ SR_{EP+Col} = E[r_{EP+Col} - r_f] / \sigma_{EP+Col} = 0.115/0.1331 = 0.8640$   $\circ TR_{EP+Col} = E[r_{EP+Col} - r_f] / \beta_{EP+Col} = 0.115/0.81 = 0.14198$ 

Example (continuation):
Colombia – Interpretation of Ratios:
SR<sub>EP+Col</sub> = E[*r<sub>EP+Col</sub> - r<sub>f</sub>*] / σ<sub>EP+Col</sub> = 0.115/0.1331 = 0.8640
Interpretation of SR: An additional unit of total risk (1%) increases returns by .864%.
TR<sub>EP+Col</sub> = E[*r<sub>EP+Col</sub> - r<sub>f</sub>*] / β<sub>EP+Col</sub> = 0.115/0.81 = 0.14198
Interpretation of TR: An additional unit of systematic risk increases returns by .142%.

Example (continuation): • Brazil  $E[r_{EP+Brazil} - r_f] = 0.135$   $\sigma_{EP+Brazil} = 0.1339$   $\beta_{EP+Brazil} = 0.69$   $SR_{EP+Brazil} = 0.135/0.1339 = 1.0082 > SR_{EP+Col} = 0.8640$   $TR_{EP+Brazil} = 0.135/0.69 = 0.19565 > TR_{EP+Col} = 0.14198$   $\Rightarrow$  Under both measures, Brazilian project is superior. • Existing portfolio of the company (to compare to Brazilian project):  $SR_{EP} = (.13 - .03)/.12 = .833 < SR_{EP+Brazil} = 1.0082$   $TR_{EP} = (.13 - .03)/.90 = .111 < TR_{EP+Brazil} = 0.19565$   $\Rightarrow$  Using both measures, diversify internationally! Q: Why? Because it improves the risk-reward profile for the company.



Q: Why does the frontier move in the NW direction?
A: Low Correlations! Low correlations are the key to achieve lower risk.
• *Empirical Fact #1: Low Correlations*The correlations across national markets (1970-2022) are lower than the correlations across securities in most domestic markets.
• Return correlations are moderate.

Average for developed markets: 0.52.
⇒ lowest average correlation in a developed market: Japan (0.38)

• Common economic policies matter:

Average intra-European correlation: .57
Average intra-Asian correlation: .42

• There is a regional (neighborhood) effect:

US & Canada = 0.76; Germany & France = 0.75

- US & Japan = 0.39; US & New Zealand = 0.45.

• Emerging Markets tend to have lower correlations.

The lowest average correlations in our sample of 50 MSCI market:

Pakistan (0.21), Morocco (0.26), Nigeria (0.27), Argentina (0.28), Turkey (0.32), Indonesia (0.33) & Egypt (0.33).

<u>Remark</u>: These are the countries that provide the highest diversification potential.



#### • Empirical fact 2: Correlations are time-varying

Correlations change over time: Also between U.S. stocks, but not as much as international correlation. Note also they are higher!







• Empirical fact 2: Correlations are time-varying			
A "correlation bubble" is bad news for international (and domestic) investors: High correlations $\Rightarrow$ more volatile portfolios.			
• In addition, higher volatility ⇒ higher option premiums (higher insurance cost!).			
• Investors like diversification. They look for low correlated assets: <i>treasury bonds</i> , <i>commodities</i> (gold, oil, etc.), <i>real</i> estate.			
• But, diversification can work with highly correlated assets.			
<b>Example</b> : The correlation between the U.S. and Canadian markets is .75, from 1970:Jan to 2021:June. RVAR (U.S. only) = 0.15,			
RVAR(0.3.  only) = 0.13, RVAR(50%  US  & 50%  Canada) = 0.18.			









## • Empirical Fact 5: Investors do not diversify enough

Many studies show that domestic investors tend to invest at home. In a 2002 UBS survey, the most internationally diversified investors are Netherlands (62%), Japan (27%) and the U.K. (25%).

 $\Rightarrow$  The U.S. ranks at the bottom of list: only 11%.

More recent data, from Hu(2020), shows better proportions. For example, the U.K. & the U.S. international allocations are 70% & 30%, respectively.

This empirical fact is called the **Home Bias**.

Proposed explanations for home bias and low correlations:

- (1) Currency risk.
- (2) Information costs.
- (3) Controls to the free flow of capital.
- (4) Country or political risk.
- (5) Cognitive bias.





• Why do we have a separate market segment: Emerging Markets?					
- Information problem is big. It involves financial, product, and labor					
markets.					
- Distortionary regulation and/or inefficient regulation					
- Judicial system not reliable (contracts enforcement a question mark)					
• Labor markets - Problems					
- Lack of educational institutions to train people					
- No certification and screening					
- Labor regulation that limits layoffs					
- Solutions					
- Groups provide training programs (group specific)					
- Internal labor markets					

• Why do we have	ve a separate market segment: Emerging Markets?
• Regulation	<ul> <li>Problems <ul> <li>Too many regulations or unequal enforcement</li> </ul> </li> <li>Solution <ul> <li>Intermediation between government and individual companies. Lobbying &amp; educating politicians.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
• Judicial system	<ul> <li>Problems</li> <li>Contracts not enforceable</li> <li>Solution</li> <li>International arbitration clauses</li> <li>Reputation for honest dealings</li> </ul>



